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MIND THE GAP: THE EQUALITY BILL AND 
SHARIA ARBITRATION IN THE  
UNITED KINGDOM 
Rebecca E. Maret* 
Abstract: The observance of Sharia principles in Islamic arbitration tri-
bunals operating in the United Kingdom has been heralded for its ability 
to provide Muslim communities with internal, community-based fora for 
dispute resolution. Although the judgments issued by these faith-based 
arbitration tribunals lack binding legal authority, British lawmakers ex-
press concerns centered on threats to the existing national legal system 
and to England’s deeply rooted social policy of equality and non-
discrimination. Introduced to address these concerns in 2011, the Equal-
ity Bill proposes a legislative solution to further maintain the principle of 
equality within alternative dispute resolution channels. This Note argues 
that, despite the Equality Bill’s laudable effort to curb discrimination and 
violations of England’s policy of equality, legislative reform alone will be 
unlikely to affect the Bill’s desired goals. 
Introduction 
 Over past decades, the United Kingdom has experienced a steady 
growth of Muslim communities within its borders, and with it, a surge 
of faith-based arbitration services for Muslims.1 Recent estimates posit 
that at least eighty-five Islamic law councils or tribunals currently oper-
ate throughout the United Kingdom.2 Although the judgments issued 
by these faith-based arbitration tribunals lack binding legal authority,3 
the tribunals continue to offer mediation services for family, business, 
 
* Rebecca E. Maret is the Executive Note Editor of the Boston College International & 
Comparative Law Review. 
1 See Denis MacEoin, Sharia Law or ‘One Law for All’? 69 (David G. Green ed., 
2009); Almas Khan, The Interaction Between Shariah and International Law in Arbitration, 6 
Chi. J. Int’l L. 791, 800 (2006); Javaid Rehman, The Sharia, Islamic Family Laws and Interna-
tional Human Rights Law: Examining the Theory and Practice of Polygamy and Talaq, 21 Int’l 
J.L. Pol’y & Fam. 108, 123 (2007). 
2 MacEoin, supra note 1, at 69. 
3 John R. Bowen, How Could English Courts Recognize Shariah?, 7 U. St. Thomas L.J. 411, 
412 (2010). 
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and some criminal law disputes,4 and their associated judgments have 
been considered by judges in English civil courts.5 
 On June 7, 2011, Baroness Caroline Cox proposed a bill (Equality 
Bill) in the House of Lords that seeks to limit the legality of Islamic law 
courts operating in England and Wales.6 The Equality Bill aims to pro-
vide additional protection for victims of domestic abuse and to make 
further provisions concerning equality under the law of alternative ar-
bitration and mediation services.7 If passed, the Equality Bill would in-
troduce a maximum five-year jail sentence for any person falsely claim-
ing that Islamic law courts or councils have legal jurisdiction over family 
or criminal law,8 and would effectively force Islamic arbitration councils 
“to acknowledge the primacy of English law.”9 The Equality Bill has yet 
to receive a vote in the House of Lords, but already it has intensified 
the debate on how the United Kingdom might address the challenges 
posed by the complex relationship between the State and the minority 
cultural and religious populations living within English society.10 
 This Note proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides a background 
on Islamic law and the development of Islamic arbitration tribunals in 
the United Kingdom. Part I also details the growth and importance of 
arbitration in England. Part II discusses the Equality Bill, giving particu-
                                                                                                                      
4 Arsani William, An Unjust Doctrine of Civil Arbitration: Sharia Courts in Canada and Eng-
land, 11 Stan. J. Int’l Rel. 40, 42–43 (2010). 
5 See Bowen, supra note 3, at 423. See generally Uddin v. Choudhury, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 
1205 (appeal taken from Eng.) (considering the testimony of a court-appointed joint ex-
pert on principles of Sharia). 
6 See Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill, 2010-12, H.L. Bill [72] cl. 1 (Eng. 
and Wales); Nesrine Malik, What Is Lady Cox’s Bill Really About?, Guardian (London), June 
20, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2011/jun/20/lady-cox-bill-womens-
rights. 
7 Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill pmbl., § 8. 
8 See id. § 7. 
9 Karen McVeigh & Amelia Hill, Bill Limiting Sharia Law Is Motivated by ‘Concern for Muslim 
Women’, Guardian (London), June 8, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/jun/08/ 
sharia-bill-lords-muslim-women. 
10 See, e.g., Andy McSmith, The Big Question: How Do Britain’s Sharia Courts Work, and Are 
They a Good Thing?, Indep. (London), June 30, 2009, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/the-big-question-how-do-britains-
sharia-courts-work-and-are-they-a-good- thing-1724486.html (describing support and opposi-
tion to the Equality Bill); Suhaib Hasan, Statement by the Islamic Sharia Council on Lady Cox’s 
Recently Proposed Bill, Islamic Sharia Council, http://www.islamic-
sharia.org/news/statement-by-the-islamic-sharia-council-on-lady-coxs-on-recently-proposed-
2.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2013) (opposing the Equality Bill); see also Patrick Macklem, Mili-
tant Democracy, Legal Pluralism, and the Paradox of Self-Determination, 4 Int’l J. Const. L. 488, 
489 (2006) (discussing the rebirth of religious, ethnic, and cultural communities within Eu-
rope). 
2013] The U.K. Equality Bill, Sharia Arbitration, and the Law-Society Gap 257 
lar consideration to those aspects of the Bill that would impact Islamic 
arbitration tribunals. Part II also considers England’s historical com-
mitment to equality as shown by various pieces of equality legislation. 
Part III analyzes the potential impact of the Equality Bill, and argues 
that although the Bill is laudable in its objective, its intended conse-
quences may only truly be realized by engaging in social—not simply 
legal—reform aimed at bridging the gap between England’s existing 
legal system and its cultural minority populations. 
I. Background 
A. Islam in England 
 Historically, Islamic culture has maintained a practice of encourag-
ing peaceful resolution of disputes involving Muslims.11 Rooted in an 
understanding of Muslims as shahadat— “witness over other nations” — 
Islam emphasizes that peace must first come from within and among 
Muslims themselves.12 To be deserving of shahadat, Muslims must also 
be committed to initiating peace among their non-Muslim neighbors 
and other communities.13 
 Described as the “kernel of Islam,”14 Sharia, or Islamic law, provides 
Muslims not just with a formal legal code dictating what individuals are 
bound to do under law, but “what [individuals] ought, in conscience, to 
do or refrain from doing.”15 Sharia derives not from a central code or 
institution, but from a number of historical Islamic texts, including the 
Quran and the Sunna.16 Aimed at establishing standards of rights and 
responsibilities for Muslim societies, the Quran advances values such as 
compassion, good faith, and justice,17 and the Sunna provides a model 
for Muslim behavior based on “a more profound spiritual and religious 
meaning.”18 In drawing upon these sources, Sharia principles encour-
                                                                                                                      
11 R. Seth Shippee, “Blessed Are the Peacemakers”: Faith-Based Approaches to Dispute Resolu-
tion, 9 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 237, 245 (2002). 
12 Id. at 246. 
13 Id. 
14 Nicholas Pengelley, Faith-Based Arbitration in Ontario, 9 Vindobona J. Int’l Com. L. 
& Arb. 111, 114 (2005). 
15 Gamal Moursi Badr, Islamic Law: Its Relation to Other Legal Systems, 26 Am. J. Comp. L. 
187, 189 (1978). 
16 See Dominic McGoldrick, Accommodating Muslims in Europe: From Adopting Sharia Law 
to Religiously Based Opt Outs from Generally Applicable Laws, 9 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 603, 606 
(2009). 
17 See Rehman, supra note 1, at 110. 
18 Id. at 111. 
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age Muslims toward peace, reconciliation, and dialogue in the resolu-
tion of disputes.19 
                                                                                                                     
 Traditional Islamic principles explain that Muslims should not 
immigrate to non-Muslim nations unless they are prepared to accept 
and obey the laws and customs of those nations.20 From the perspective 
of many Muslim authorities, Muslims who nevertheless choose to move 
to non-Muslim nations “are required to accept the legal standards of 
the countries to which they move and to live there peacefully and re-
sponsibly, showing a good example to their non-Muslim neighbors.”21 
 In recent times, Muslims have increasingly settled in secular de-
mocratic nations, including the United Kingdom.22 In the years follow-
ing World War II, the United Kingdom experienced a significant influx 
of Muslim immigrants hailing in large part from India and Pakistan.23 
Many of these immigrants were poorly educated, and faced high levels 
of joblessness and discrimination upon arrival in the United King-
dom.24 Statistical analysis shows that even today, “Muslim communities 
on the whole remain immersed in deprivation, poverty, high unem-
ployment and low educational achievements,”25 and that “Muslims are 
also on the receiving end of a great deal of cultural antipathy, allegedly 
because of their religion.”26 
 In response to high levels of racial discrimination and social exclu-
sion, many Muslim communities in the United Kingdom, rather than 
adopting the country’s secular laws at the expense of their own religious 
heritage, have imported their culture and belief systems.27 For Muslims 
living in the United Kingdom, the continued observance of Sharia prin-
ciples provides a sense of solidarity, strengthened by the connections to 
Islamic culture and other Muslims.28 Many Muslim communities have 
 
19 See Shippee, supra note 11, at 245 (discussing principles contained within the 
Quran). 
20 Stephen Schwartz, Modern Islam and Democracy, 6 Regent J. Int’l L. 375, 377 (2008). 
21 Id. 
22 See Khan, supra note 1, at 800; Rehman, supra note 1, at 123. 
23 Javaid Rehman, The Sharia, Freedom of Religion and European Human-Rights Law, 22 
Irish Stud. Int’l Aff. 37, 46 (2011). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Joel A. Nichols, Religion, Marriage, and Pluralism, 25 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 967, 971 
(2011). 
27 Khan, supra note 1, at 800. 
28 Stephanie E. Berry, Bringing Muslim Minorities Within the International Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination—Square Peg in a Round Hole?, 11 Hum. 
Rts. L. Rev. 423, 441 (2011) (asserting that Islam provides “a badge of (symbolic) solidar-
ity”). 
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formed in reaction to “the personal insecurities and vulnerabilities of 
[Muslim immigrants], and due to the racial prejudices from the wider 
white majority population.”29 
 Community-based systems for resolving issues among Muslims liv-
ing in non-Muslim countries offer internal fora for dispute resolution, 
adjudicating matters outside the parameters of the governing civic ju-
dicial system.30 In non-Muslim countries, these alternative dispute reso-
lution channels are often relied upon by Muslims who feel more com-
fortable presenting their problems in front of those who share a similar 
value system and who can offer solutions in accordance with principles 
of Islamic law.31 England, in particular, experienced a rise in the num-
ber of community-based institutions for resolving disputes between 
Muslims during the 1980s, when several Sharia courts in London and 
Birmingham were established, with others set up throughout England 
and Wales in the decades that followed.32 
 Established in 1982, the Islamic Sharia Council continues to accept 
requests for arbitration and mediation services in its east London of-
fice.33 The Islamic Sharia Council, like other smaller Sharia councils 
around the country, has dealt with hundreds of cases involving Muslim 
marriage, divorce, finance, inheritance, domestic abuse, and criminal 
proceedings.34 For the most part, however, the business conducted by 
the Islamic Sharia Council relates to requests for divorce brought by 
young women.35 
 Since late 2010, the Islamic Sharia Council has generally required 
women seeking divorce from an Islamic marriage to satisfy a four-step 
process: they must initiate civil court divorce proceedings, show proof 
that the couple has been separated for at least one year prior to divorce 
proceedings, provide assurance that their husbands will be able to see 
any marital children after the divorce, and, in some cases, return any 
                                                                                                                      
29 Rehman, supra note 23, at 46. 
30 See Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating 
Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1231, 1252 (2011). 
31 See Caryn Litt Wolfe, Faith-Based Arbitration: Friend or Foe? An Evaluation of Religious 
Arbitration Systems and Their Interaction with Secular Courts, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 427, 441 
(2006). 
32 Bowen, supra note 3, at 418. 
33 Id. at 413. 
34 See William, supra note 4, at 43. 
35 Bowen, supra note 3, at 419. 
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mahr, or “dower,”36 given by the husband to his wife upon their mar-
riage.37 
 Though many Sharia arbitration proceedings occur without the 
involvement of British civil law, the community-based system is heralded 
by many as helping to “preserve minority cultures and community val-
ues.”38 Many Muslim immigrants, unfamiliar with the formalities of 
English legal proceedings, may appreciate arbitration tribunals that are 
more flexible and do not require the execution of many legal formali-
ties.39 As one scholar has noted, one of the principal benefits of com-
munity-based dispute resolution systems like those of the Sharia courts 
in England are their ability to “[s]ecure[] the authority of the local, 
common people in the formulation and application of Islamic law as 
opposed to a remote, centralized authority dominated by professional 
jurists and scholars.”40 
B. Arbitration in England 
 In issuing rulings on divorce and other disputes brought before 
them, Sharia arbitration tribunals in England generally acknowledge 
the legitimacy of each other’s judgments, thereby giving rise to the de-
velopment of consensus on the procedural aspects of particular is-
sues—notably, divorce.41 Nevertheless, controversy surrounds the legal-
ity of such judgments under English civil law, and whether English civil 
courts may consider awards handed down by Sharia arbitration tribu-
nals.42 The issue of precisely how to situate such faith-based dispute 
resolution channels within the existing English legal framework be-
comes more complex when viewed in the context of England’s histori-
cal understanding of the role of arbitration tribunals.43 
                                                                                                                      
36 Id. at 414. 
37 Id. at 419. 
38 Wolfe, supra note 31, at 441. 
39 See Lee Ann Bambach, The Enforceability of Arbitration Decisions Made by Muslim Reli-
gious Tribunals: Examining the Beth Din Precedent, 25 J.L. & Religion 379, 403–04 (2009–
2010). The cited article comments on the experience of Muslim immigrants in the United 
States; however, the discussion is relevant to the Muslim immigrant experience in other 
Western liberal democracies, including England and Wales. See id. 
40 Irshad Abdal-Haqq & Qadir Abdal-Haqq, Community-Based Arbitration as a Vehicle for 
Implementing Islamic Law in the United States, 1 J. Islamic L. 61, 73 (1996). 
41 See Bowen, supra note 3, at 418, 421. 
42 See Rex Ahdar & Nicholas Aroney, The Topography of Shari’a in the Western Political 
Landscape, in Shari’a in the West 1, 1 (Rex Ahdar & Nicholas Aroney eds., 2010). 
43 See infra notes 107–109. 
2013] The U.K. Equality Bill, Sharia Arbitration, and the Law-Society Gap 261 
 The use of arbitration to resolve disputes outside of established ju-
dicial institutions has deep roots in English history.44 By the end of the 
tenth century, a system of dispute resolution in Anglo-Saxon England 
had evolved as an alternative to the “practice of resolving disputes 
through violent methods of self-help.”45 Arbitration proceedings in me-
dieval England generally involved trade and commercial disputes,46 and 
such proceedings were employed increasingly from the thirteenth 
through the fifteenth centuries47 as arbitration gained appreciation 
among plaintiffs who heralded such proceedings as quicker and cheap-
er than litigation.48 Parties to arbitration proceedings were sometimes 
provided with a written statement of the judgment, which included a 
penalty for failure to obey the judgment’s terms; in cases of non-
compliance, a party could bring an action of debt or detinue at com-
mon law to collect damages for the other party’s failure to perform the 
award.49 In this sense, arbitration proceedings and awards remained 
subordinate to the law of English courts, wherein English courts “pro-
vided the legal framework for arbitration agreements and the fora for 
the enforcement of, or appeal from, arbitration decisions.”50 
 Through the fifteenth century, English common law permitted the 
use of arbitration proceedings as an alternative means of dispute reso-
lution,51 but also retained the notion that arbitration proceedings re-
mained subordinate to English civil courts.52 To this end, English 
common law maintained that arbitration agreements were revocable, 
on the theory that such agreements, “while not absolutely illegal, were 
opposed to public policy because they tended to oust the courts of ju-
risdiction.”53 Toward the end of the seventeenth century, however, 
growing concern emerged over the high costs of litigation and its ad-
verse impact upon the national economy.54 
                                                                                                                      
44 See Joseph Biancalana, The Legal Framework of Arbitration in Fifteenth-Century England, 
47 Am. J. Legal Hist. 347, 348 (2005); Sidney P. Simpson, Specific Enforcement of Arbitration 
Contracts, 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 160, 160 (1934). 
45 Valerie A. Sanchez, Towards a History of ADR: The Dispute Processing Continuum in An-
glo-Saxon England and Today, 11 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 1, 35 (1996). 
46 See Michael H. LeRoy, Crowning the New King: The Statutory Arbitrator and the Demise of 
Judicial Review, 2009 J. Disp. Resol. 1, 14. 
47 See Biancalana, supra note 44, at 348. 
48 See id. at 355. 
49 See id. at 374. 
50 Id. at 348. 
51 See id. 
52 See id. 
53 Simpson, supra note 44, at 162 (footnote omitted). 
54 See LeRoy, supra note 46, at 18. 
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 Recognizing that “arbitration was valuable for resolving trade dis-
putes,”55 England enacted the Arbitration Act of 1698,56 which author-
ized courts to enforce arbitration awards if the parties agreed in advance 
that any award might be made a rule of court.57 The Act, in authorizing 
proceedings for the resolution of disputes involving “merchants and 
traders”58 adopted a commercial purpose.59 By legitimizing the awards 
issued by arbitration tribunals engaged in resolving commercial dis-
putes, the Act worked to relieve congestion in courts and reduce the 
high costs and protracted nature of the hearings associated with litiga-
tion.60 
 Beginning in the nineteenth century, general principles relating to 
the administration of arbitration proceedings were detailed in succes-
sive arbitration Acts.61 These Acts, passed in 1889, 1934, 1950, and 
1979, increasingly sought to limit judicial intervention in arbitration.62 
The Acts also progressively decreased judicial power to ensure arbitra-
tors’ compliance with English law by both limiting courts’ control over 
arbitration proceedings and their ability to hear disgruntled parties’ 
appeals from arbitration awards.63 
 The most recent reformation to English arbitration law arrived with 
the enactment of the Arbitration Act 1996 (Arbitration Act), which 
                                                                                                                      
55 Id. 
56 See An Act for Determining Differences by Arbitration, 1697–8, 9 & 10 Will. 3, c. 15 
(Eng.), available at http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=46901&strquery= 
arbitration. 
57 See LeRoy, supra note 46, at 18; Simpson, supra note 44, at 165 (“If made a rule of 
court, refusal to perform the award was punishable as a contempt.”). 
58 An Act for Determining Differences by Arbitration, 9 & 10 Will. 3, c. 15. 
59 See LeRoy, supra note 46, at 19. 
60 Cf. id. at 18 (“Conventional litigation in courts of law caused tedious attendance and 
vast expenses that tended to result in empty purses and grey heads.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
61 See Sir Anthony Evans, Arbitration and the Role of Law, 21 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 295, 298 
(2010). 
62 See Okezie Chukwumerije, English Arbitration Act 1996: Reform and Consolidation of 
English Arbitration Law, 8 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 21, 27 (1997); Evans, supra note 61, at 298; 
Lord Hacking, The “Stated Case” Abolished: The United Kingdom Arbitration Act of 1979, 14 
Int’l Law. 95, 101 (1980) (noting that the 1979 Arbitration Act affords parties to arbitra-
tion agreements the right to exclude judicial review); Michael Kerr, Statutes: The Arbitration 
Act 1979, 43 Mod. L. Rev 45, 48 (1980) (noting that the 1979 Arbitration Act attempted to 
strike a compromise between the view that courts should be kept out of arbitration alto-
gether and the view that courts should retain a substantial measure of control over arbitra-
tions to ensure that arbitration awards apply the law of the land); Simpson, supra note 44, 
at 160 (noting that the 1934 Arbitration Act explained that once an award had been made 
pursuant to an arbitration agreement, equity would enforce it if a contract between the 
parties would be specifically enforceable). 
63 See Evans, supra note 61, at 298. 
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sought to consolidate previous arbitration statutes and incorporate re-
cent changes made by judicial decisions in England.64 The general prin-
ciples outlined in Part I of the Arbitration Act specify that parties to ar-
bitrations “should be free to agree how their disputes are resolved, 
subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public interest,” 
and that “the court should not intervene” except in such instances.65 In 
addition, the Act indicates that an arbitrator is held immune from “any-
thing done or omitted in the discharge or purported discharge of his 
[or her] functions as arbitrator unless the act or omission is shown to 
have been in bad faith.”66 In limiting the judicial reach of English courts 
into the arbitral process, the Arbitration Act effectively strengthened the 
power and authority of these arbitration tribunals, thereby promoting 
“the autonomy and effectiveness of the arbitral process and respect for 
the parties’ preference for a private system of dispute resolution.”67 
C. Islamic Arbitration in England Under Arbitration Act 1996 
 Shortly after the Arbitration Act was enacted, various Muslim law-
yers interpreted the general principles enumerated in Part I of the Act 
as legitimizing Sharia councils to “act as arbitration panels” with the 
authority to issue “decisions [that] are legally binding,”68 provided that 
all parties to a dispute grant the arbitral tribunal “the power to rule on 
their case.”69 In 2007, a Muslim lawyer established the Muslim Arbitra-
tion Tribunal (MAT), housed in the Hijaz College Islamic University in 
Nuneaton, Britain,70 claiming that the Arbitration Act granted legal 
jurisdiction to MAT.71 In August of that year, informal Sharia courts 
began to be established, taking on a variety of domestic disputes, par-
ticularly in the area of family law.72 
                                                                                                                     
 Reacting to the growing prominence of Islamic arbitral tribunals 
throughout England, one scholar has noted that “traditional, faith-based 
alternatives to the mainstream legal system are alive and well, and, in 
 
64 See Chukwumerije, supra note 62, at 21. 
65 Arbitration Act 1996, 1996, c. 23, § 1 (Eng., Wales, and N. Ir.). 
66 Id. § 29. 
67 See Chukwumerije, supra note 62, at 45. 
68 McSmith, supra note 10. 
69 McGoldrick, supra note 16, at 637; see Maria Reiss, The Materialization of Legal Plural-
ism in Britain: Why Shari’a Council Decisions Should Be Non-Binding, 26 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. 
L. 739, 760 (2009). 
70 Mona Rafeeq, Rethinking Islamic Law Arbitration Tribunals: Are They Compatible with 
Traditional American Notions of Justice?, 28 Wis. Int’l L.J. 108, 124 (2010). 
71 William, supra note 4, at 43. 
72 Reiss, supra note 69, at 768. 
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many ways, busier and more influential than ever.”73 Recently, the Brit-
ish Court of Appeal deferred to the role of faith-based arbitral tribunals 
in the case of Halpern v. Halpern.74 In that case, the presiding Lord Jus-
tice Waller announced, in reference to a dispute arbitrated through a 
faith-based tribunal, that “arbitral tribunals can and indeed should de-
cide disputes in accordance with the law chosen by the parties.”75 
 More recently, in 2009, the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal 
for England and Wales decided the case of Uddin v. Choudhury.76 In that 
case, English civil courts heard a dispute between two Muslim families 
arising out of a failed arranged marriage.77 The marriage had been 
conducted in England in 2003 in an Islamic ceremony, called a nikah, 
and although the parties had originally intended to hold a civil cere-
mony following the nikah, none was ever held.78 At the end of 2004, the 
wife applied to the Islamic Sharia Council for a divorce, which the 
Council issued in December of that year, dissolving the marriage.79 In 
August 2005, the ex-husband, Mr. Mohammed Uddin, initiated civil 
proceedings to recover the value of £25,000, which he alleged had been 
taken by his wife’s family during the marriage.80 In response, the ex-
wife and her family brought a counterclaim, alleging that Mr. Uddin 
had agreed to pay his wife £15,000 by way of a mahr, or dowry, per the 
marriage agreement, and that this amount was outstanding.81 
 The trial court relied on evidence offered by a court-appointed 
expert on Sharia law,82 which the court considered relevant given that 
the parties had dealt with each other under Sharia principles.83 The 
expert testified that the evidence given by the defendant and her family 
was stronger than that given by the plaintiff.84 The trial judge accepted 
this conclusion and determined that the value sought by the plaintiff 
                                                                                                                      
73 Shippee, supra note 11, at 238. 
74 Halpern v. Halpern, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 291, [37], [2008] Q.B. 195 [37] (Eng. and 
Wales); see Reiss, supra note 69, at 741. 
75 Halpern, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 291 at [37]. 
76 See generally Uddin v. Choudhury, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1205 (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
77 Id. at [2]. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at [2]–[3]. 
81 Id. at [3]. 
82 See Bowen, supra note 3, at 423 (noting that the appointment of a single joint expert 
by the trial judge meant that both parties accepted this person as an expert in the matter). 
83 Uddin, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1205 at [3]. 
84 See id. at [3]–[4]. 
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was unrecoverable.85 The judge found that the £25,000 was partly com-
prised of various gifts that had been made by the plaintiff to the defen-
dant and her family; because these gifts were not made conditional on 
the marriage as part of the mahr, once these gifts were made, they were 
absolute.86 On the defendant’s counterclaim, the judge held that the 
marriage contract, enumerating a mahr to be paid to the defendant and 
her family, constituted a validly-executed contract; as such, it was en-
forceable by the court, and the defendant was awarded £15,000.87 
 On appeal, the court considered only whether the trial judge’s 
opinion was legally and procedurally sound, and did not review the 
content of the evidence previously offered by the parties.88 The Court 
of Appeal affirmed the ruling of the lower court, holding that the trial 
court judge correctly summarized and applied those principles of Sha-
ria concerning marriage and dowry proffered by the expert.89 The 
court added that the marriage ceremony was not recognized by English 
law, but that the marriage agreement was valid and had legal effect.90 
In analyzing the effect of the expert evidence on Sharia principles in 
the lower court, the Court of Appeal added that “as a matter of Sharia 
law in the circumstances of this marriage and its dissolution, the gifts 
were absolute, not returnable, not deductible from the dowry, and the 
dowry was payable notwithstanding the failure of the marriage.”91 
                                                                                                                     
 Uddin was one of the first cases to concern the intersection of Sha-
ria principles and the English legal system within English courts.92 Al-
though the Uddin court relied on expert testimony to affirm the exis-
tence of an Islamic marriage agreement as a validly executed contract, 
controversy surrounds the issue of whether English civil courts may 
consider awards handed down by Sharia councils and arbitration tribu-
nals.93 As one scholar points out, the Uddin court found it “unnecessary 
to inquire into the [Sharia] Council’s ruling, and apparently no one 
asked further about it in court.”94 In addition, the trial judge relied up-
 
85 Id. at [5]. 
86 Id. 
87 See id. at [7]. 
88 See id. at [5]. 
89 Uddin, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1205 at [11]. 
90 Id. at [11], [13] (“As a matter of contract, arising out of the agreement which the 
parties had made, I think that the judge was entitled in law to say that this was an enforce-
able agreement . . . .”). 
91 Id. at [14]. 
92 See Bowen, supra note 3, at 424. 
93 See id. 
94 Id. 
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on the testimony of a single expert called to give evidence on principles 
of Sharia, but some commentators have questioned the status of this 
witness’s expertise, “given that he failed to draw the judge’s attention to 
the Islamic rule that where the marriage is dissolved before consumma-
tion . . . the wife may lose the mahr.”95 The danger inherent in such an 
approach by judges is that it may lead to “an over-reliance on the testi-
mony of the expert witness, which, when misunderstood, misapplied or 
downright erroneous can have dismaying consequences for fair and 
accurate dispute settlement.”96 Even beyond fears that such an ap-
proach may upset the fair settlement of disputes in private arbitration 
tribunals is the concern that rendering a decision in English civil courts 
that relies on principles of Sharia gives legal effect to decisions that 
have clear Islamic content.97 In this sense, Uddin may be understood to 
have paved the way to more formal recognition by English civil courts 
of awards handed down by Islamic arbitration tribunals—even awards 
concerning marriage and family law, which fall outside the permitted 
subject-matter jurisdiction of arbitration tribunals.98 
 Around the same time that Uddin was decided, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury delivered a widely contested speech at the Royal Court of 
Justice in London in which he suggested that some overlap between 
diverse systems of law was “unavoidable.”99 Despite the critical media 
response to the Archbishop’s remarks, Lord Chief Justice Phillips, Brit-
ain’s former highest judge, supported the Archbishop’s position in a 
public statement in which he affirmed that “where the principles [of 
Sharia] did not come into conflict with the laws of England and Wales 
they could be followed without legal interference.”100 
 Despite the semblance of increased legitimacy conferred upon Is-
lamic arbitral tribunals by the Arbitration Act, controversy continues to 
grow as British politicians voice concerns over gender-based discrimina-
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tion against women participating in Sharia arbitrations.101 Because these 
proceedings occur in private, the concerns relate to whether “one of the 
parties may . . . have been pressured or coerced into participation, or 
deprived of rights which would be guaranteed had the matter pro-
ceeded under the jurisdiction of the civil courts.”102 Although operation 
of Sharia arbitration tribunals has been justified by the proposition that 
all parties resort to them voluntarily, women are often placed “in a 
poorer position than [they] would have been had [they] litigated under 
British courts.”103 This general disparity in outcomes becomes particu-
larly concerning when considering that many Muslim women are often 
pressured by family and community members to submit to arbitration 
and “keep dealings within the Sharia court,”104 despite the potential for 
injustice for women in solving disputes through this method.105 
 Even beyond fears of gender-based bias and coercion are concerns 
that Sharia tribunals have begun to transform the historically-accepted 
role of arbitration in England as a medium for resolving commercial dis-
putes.106 For example, although the Arbitration Act specifically prohib-
its any arbitration tribunal from hearing criminal matters, the fact that 
there is so little oversight of Sharia arbitration has created a space for 
Sharia tribunals to arbitrate beyond the purely commercial and “in-
clude smaller, criminal matters in their repertoire.”107 Because of this 
shift in the use of arbitration as a means for resolving commercial mat-
ters to a far more expansive dispute-resolution channel, English law has 
been faced with the challenge of balancing an interest in preserving 
the “autonomy of arbitration” with the need to uphold fairness and 
equality through judicial intervention.108 
 The expanded subject-matter jurisdiction of Islamic arbitration 
tribunals has become particularly disconcerting for British lawmakers 
because awards handed down by arbitral tribunals are not readily ap-
pealed.109 Section 69(2) of the Arbitration Act provides that “[a]n ap-
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peal shall not be brought . . . except with the agreement of all the other 
parties to the proceedings, or with the leave of the court.”110 Currently 
under the Arbitration Act, “[a]s long as the Shari’a courts abide by the 
provisions set forth in the Arbitration Act, any decision made by the 
Shari’a court becomes binding.”111 Therefore, under the Arbitration 
Act, English law has effectively “created an outlet for parallel legal sys-
tems to acquire legitimacy.”112 
II. Discussion 
A. The Equality Bill 
 Introduced in the House of Lords on June 7, 2011, the Equality 
Bill expressly aimed to further govern arbitration and mediation ser-
vices and protect victims of domestic abuse.113 A primary consideration 
in the Bill’s drafting involved growing concerns that religious courts 
operating in England and Wales have been suffering from “jurisdiction 
creep”114 by “going well beyond their legal remit [where] some [Islamic 
arbitration] rulings are being misrepresented as having the force of the 
U.K. law.”115 To this end, Baroness Cox indicated that the Equality Bill 
is intended to address the possibility that some Islamic arbitration tri-
bunals have moved away from deciding purely commercial matters, and 
toward expanding their arbitral repertoire.116 
 Another consideration in the Equality Bill’s drafting centered on a 
concern that women face possible discrimination in their dealings with 
Sharia tribunals.117 Baroness Cox expressed concerns that Muslim 
women are being deprived of their legal rights, and are being “‘intimi-
dated’ and ‘coerced’ into going before [Islamic arbitration tribunals],” 
often because these women lack an understanding of their rights and 
the recourse available under U.K. law.118 
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 As a response to these concerns, the Equality Bill proposes to 
amend various English Acts—notably, the Arbitration Act.119 If passed, 
the Equality Bill would insert into the Arbitration Act a provision enti-
tled “6A: Discriminatory Terms of Arbitration.”120 Section 6 of the Arbi-
tration Act currently provides a limited description of the definition of 
arbitration agreements,121 but this new section would prohibit arbitra-
tion agreements or processes from expressly or implicitly providing 
“that the evidence of a man is worth more than the evidence of a wom-
an,”122 “that the division of an estate between male and female children 
on intestacy must be unequal,”123 and “that women should have fewer 
property rights than men.”124 The new section would also prohibit arbi-
tration agreements and processes from providing “for any other term 
that constitutes discrimination on the grounds of sex.”125 An additional 
provision proposed by the Equality Bill would insert a set of require-
ments following Section 80 of the Arbitration Act,126 which currently 
outlines “Notice and Other Requirements in Connection with Legal 
Proceedings.”127 This new Equality Bill provision, entitled “80A: Crimi-
nal and Family Law Matters Not Arbitrable,” would prevent “[a]ny mat-
ter which is within the jurisdiction of the criminal or family courts [from 
being] the subject of arbitration proceedings.”128 
 The Equality Bill also proposes amendments to other English 
Acts.129 Adding to a section of the 2010 Equality Act pertaining to the 
duties of public authorities,130 the Equality Bill would require public 
authorities to take active steps to remove or minimize inequities, in-
cluding “steps to take account of the fact that those who are married 
according to certain religious practices . . . may be without legal protec-
tion,”131 and steps to inform “individuals of the need to obtain an offi-
cially recognised marriage in order to have legal protection.”132 The 
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Equality Bill would also amend the Courts and Legal Services Act of 
1990133 by adding an additional provision to Section 118 of the Act, the 
Functions of Treasury.134 The new provision details the terms by which 
a person who falsely claims legal jurisdiction may be guilty of an of-
fense, which would include instances in which a person “falsely pur-
ports to be exercising a judicial function or to be able to make legally 
binding rules,”135 or when a person “otherwise falsely purports to adju-
dicate on any matter which that person knows or ought to know is with-
in the jurisdiction of the criminal or family courts.”136 The Equality Bill 
would impose a punishment on any person guilty of an offense under 
this new section of imprisonment for up to five years, a fine, or both.137 
 Although the Equality Bill does not specifically refer to Sharia arbi-
tration tribunals, Baroness Cox described her support for the Equality 
Bill as stemming from concerns related to discrimination against wom-
en, as well as the incompatibility of allowing a parallel legal system to 
operate within the United Kingdom.138 As Baroness Cox explained dur-
ing an interview shortly after she tabled the Bill in June 2011, the 
Equality Bill would not prevent people from seeking advice and guid-
ance from religious leaders.139 Rather, it would impose a duty upon 
public authorities—such as the police, social workers, and health care 
workers—to inform women with whom they come into contact of their 
rights under English law, and would limit the authority of arbitral tri-
bunals to adjudicate matters of family or criminal law.140 For Baroness 
Cox, the notion of allowing arbitration tribunals to develop into a par-
allel legal system is incompatible with “[England’s] own historic and 
traditional legal system, particularly [where the parallel system] dis-
criminates against women and is causing many women real suffer-
ing.”141 
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B. Equality and the Principle of Non-Discrimination in England 
 The various amendments proposed by the Equality Bill endeavor 
to bring arbitration and mediation services within the ambit of equality 
legislation operating in England and Wales.142 At the heart of the 
Equality Bill’s aims is an interest in more narrowly focusing the legal 
system’s application of equality legislation—particularly in its applica-
tion to arbitration and mediation services—on the principle of non-
discrimination.143 This principle has recently become a central goal of 
equality laws in England.144 
 In the wake of World War II, the principle of non-discrimination 
formed an integral part of the political rehabilitative efforts made by 
European nations.145 Guided by an understanding of equality and hu-
man rights as a “fundamental moral attribute of all human persons,”146 
England and other European nations drew on a theory of political lib-
eralism that individual autonomy should not be subject to arbitrary 
prejudice.147 In England, political concern for ensuring social equality 
was reflected in the gradual recognition of legal rights that encom-
passed a greater range of historically disadvantaged social and cultural 
groups.148 Demands for expanded anti-discrimination legislation that 
could account for religious groups—particularly Muslims—grew within 
Britain toward the end of the twentieth century.149 After the introduc-
tion of the Equality Race Directives in 2000 by the European Commis-
sion, England and all other European Union members were required 
to implement a number of equality duties within their own domestic 
legal structures by 2007.150 The result in England was the passing of the 
Equality Act 2006.151 
 As the predecessor to the Equality Act 2010, the Equality Act 2006 
introduced a number of anti-discrimination provisions into the English 
legal system, including provisions relating to discrimination on the ba-
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sis of religion, belief, or sexual orientation, and it imposed duties upon 
persons performing public functions relating to sex discrimination.152 
Rather than assuming a neutral approach to equality legislation, the 
Equality Act 2006 adopted a far more proactive policy by enacting posi-
tive duties for public sector authorities to eliminate discrimination and 
promote equality.153 Chief among the duties established by the Act was 
a general duty for public authorities to heed the need “to eliminate un-
lawful discrimination and harassment,”154 and also “to promote equality 
of opportunity between men and women.”155 
 In addition to imposing those general duties, the Equality Act also 
established the Commission for Equality and Human Rights (CEHR),156 
a body intended to better address issues of group discrimination and 
promote the “cross-fertilization of ideas and experience” to more thor-
oughly facilitate “fair representation, equality and diversity” within Eng-
land and Wales.157 The general duties assigned to the CEHR include 
encouraging and supporting the development of a society in which 
“people’s ability to achieve their potential is not limited by prejudice or 
discrimination,”158 and “respect and protection of each individual’s 
human rights” is achieved.159 The CEHR is also responsible for uphold-
ing “respect for the dignity and worth of each individual,”160 ensuring 
that “each individual has an equal opportunity to participate in soci-
ety,”161 promoting “mutual respect between groups based on under-
standing, and valuing of diversity and on shared respect for equality and 
human rights.”162 
                                                                                                                     
 The Equality Act 2006 specifically identified the need for the 
CEHR to target discrimination occurring within groups or classes of 
persons sharing a common attribute, including race, religion, or be-
lief.163 In this context, the Act further provided that the CEHR should 
promote understanding of the importance of good relations, encour-
age good practice between members of different groups, and “work 
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towards enabling members of groups to participate in society.”164 In 
this respect, the Act attempted to confront issues of discrimination by 
adopting positive obligations on the part of public authorities operat-
ing in English and Welsh civil society.165 
 Despite the Equality Act 2006’s laudable attempts to implement a 
proactive approach to promoting the principle of non-discrimination 
within English and Welsh society, supplemental positive obligations were 
needed in order to better secure compliance with anti-discrimination 
laws.166 Proposed as a bill to replace and incorporate many aspects of 
the Equality Act 2006, the Equality Act 2010 received strong political 
support from both Conservatives and Liberal Democrats in the House 
of Lords in April 2010, and entered into force in October 2010.167 Merg-
ing several former Acts and statutes, the Equality Act 2010 serves as a 
single replacement to nine previous pieces of legislation,168 thereby sim-
plifying and harmonizing previous discrimination law operating in Eng-
land, Wales, and Scotland.169 Although it serves as a singular replace-
ment to the Equality Act 2006, the 2010 Act incorporates key provisions 
of the prior Act, including those governing the CEHR.170 
 The overarching aims of the Equality Act 2010 are to harmonize 
and simplify equality law.171 Among its several stated goals, the Act en-
deavors to eliminate discrimination, increase equality of opportunity, 
and enable duties to be imposed upon public sector authorities relating 
to their public functions.172 In creating expanded public sector duties, 
the Equality Act 2010 “recognises that members of disadvantaged 
groups will not have equal life chances or enjoy respect for their equal 
worth unless institutions take proactive measures to ensure equality.”173 
 The new public sector equality duty contains three provisions, all 
of which encompass the need to have due regard for eliminating dis-
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crimination, harassment, victimization, and any other conduct prohib-
ited by the Act.174 The provisions also each address the need to advance 
equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant charac-
teristic and those who do not share it,175 and the need to foster good 
relationships between persons who share a relevant characteristic and 
those who do not share it.176 Rather than conferring individual rights 
upon British citizens, the Equality Act 2010 attempts to define where 
discrimination may occur, and extend public sector duties to offer add-
ed legal protection and give full effect to the right to equality.177 
III. Analysis 
A. Forecast for the Future 
 The Equality Bill proposes to further govern arbitration services in 
England and Wales, and to establish protections for the victims of do-
mestic abuse.178 In its purely textual form, the Bill may be understood 
to advance two goals.179 In one sense, it responds to the need to pre-
vent the development of parallel, competing legal systems by reaffirm-
ing the existing structure of English law.180 In another respect, the Bill 
seeks to abate a perceived threat to England’s longstanding policy of 
equality by responding to concerns of domestic abuse and gender dis-
crimination.181 Thus, the Equality Bill has both clear legal and policy 
objectives.182 
                                                                                                                     
1. Praise for the Equality Bill 
 To the extent that the Equality Bill seeks to advance its policy ob-
jective of promoting equality by targeting gender discrimination, the 
Bill has been heralded as laudable both in its intent as well as its poten-
tial practical effect.183 Immediately following the Bill’s proposal in the 
House of Lords, Bishop Michael Nazir-Ali, former Bishop of Rochester, 
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lent his support to the Bill by asserting that it would uphold the free-
dom of religion guaranteed to British citizens while also targeting the 
problem of unequal treatment occurring within Islamic arbitration tri-
bunals.184 To this end, the Bill has been praised for its potential to 
“raise consciousness that there are legal British remedies for discrimi-
nation which are freely available.”185 
 The Bill has also been touted as a competent response to concerns 
that Islamic law tribunals “threaten the integrity of law in the British 
democracy, by promoting the unequal treatment of women in the Brit-
ish Islamic community.”186 To this end, it is understood that the Bill 
seeks to regulate the operation of religious arbitration tribunals by 
prohibiting them from arbitrating matters that lie within the jurisdic-
tion of English civil courts—notably, criminal and family matters.187 In 
advancing this legal objective, some commentators anticipate that the 
Bill would likely “increase pressure on the Sharia Councils . . . to im-
prove their practice and actively clarify for their clients before initiating 
mediation that their decisions have no legal weight.”188 To the extent 
that the Equality Bill would work to construe more narrowly the chan-
nels of jurisdiction available to arbitration tribunals, some commenta-
tors forecast that the Equality Bill could provide critical clarity to an 
area of the law largely marked with confusion.189 
2. Criticism of the Equality Bill 
 Despite the laudable potential of the Equality Bill, the Bill has 
been criticized for its potentially harmful effects on England’s minority 
religious and cultural populations.190 Emphasizing the important role 
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filled by religious arbitration tribunals, such a view posits that “[t]he 
interference of secular courts in religious issues, and [courts’] tendency 
to substitute judgment for religious authorities, can threaten the pres-
ervation of cultural and religious groups and their traditions.”191 The 
Bill has also been criticized specifically for its notification obligation, 
which requires public authorities to inform individuals of the need to 
obtain an officially recognized marriage under English civil law in or-
der to receive legal protection, and that polygamous households may 
be unprotected by English law.192 Commentators posit that this re-
quirement, in addition to being impractical, “also risks causing offence 
to those who it seeks to protect by stressing the ‘unofficial’ nature of 
their marriages and confusing the problem of non-registration with 
that of polygamous marriages.”193 
 This critical perspective suggests that the ultimate deficiency in the 
proposed Bill lies in its failure to appreciate cultural sensitivities.194 In 
championing this view, the Islamic Shariah Council’s Secretary, Dr. Su-
haib Hasan, argued that the Bill “made no attempt to understand the 
workings of the shariah councils,” and that “it [was] morally wrong to 
comment on [the issue of the testimony of a woman being half of that 
of a man] without any knowledge of [it].”195 Dr. Hasan further alleged 
that Baroness Cox has done nothing more than “regurgitate[] com-
mon myths about the role of women in Islam in an effort to undermine 
the work of the shariah councils,” and that “she deserves little praise” 
for doing so.196 
 Although Dr. Hasan has suggested that Islamic arbitration tribu-
nals “already operate within the confines of current legislation,”197 the 
Equality Bill has been criticized even by those who acknowledge that 
the tribunals may, in some instances, arbitrate beyond their permissible 
subject-matter jurisdiction.198 This wave of criticism principally centers 
on an understanding that any attempt to place limits upon the opera-
tive scope of Islamic arbitration tribunals would be null, since “Bill or 
no Bill, the Sharia councils will no doubt continue.”199 Levied primarily 
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as an attack on the Bill’s enforceability, this position essentially dis-
counts the impact of the Bill’s imposition of fines and prison sentences 
for any person guilty of an offense under the Bill.200 On this view, the 
problem with the Equality Bill is that its enforcement mechanisms are 
insufficient to affect its desired changes.201 
 Given the criticism lodged against the Bill’s enforcement system, 
greater oversight is needed for the Equality Bill to affect the greatest 
progress toward its desired goals.202 In addition to the Bill’s proposed 
notification requirements, aimed at informing parties of their legal 
rights and options under English civil law prior to arbitration, Parlia-
ment should require more thorough screening of tribunals and arbitra-
tors.203 Additionally, Parliament could require tribunals to appoint at 
least two arbitrators to each dispute, and require that arbitrators hold a 
law degree or have some substantial experience within the English legal 
system.204 By imposing requirements that effectively create standards of 
qualification for arbitrators, Sharia arbitration tribunals could develop 
far more transparent procedures, more easily regulated by English law, 
rendering the Equality Bill’s ends more effectively enforceable.205 
 Beyond the criticism surrounding the Equality Bill’s enforcement 
mechanisms, others have urged that the essential problem made mani-
fest by the Bill is that its proposed reforms will ineffectively address 
deeply-rooted social issues.206 Some commentators feel that the most 
pressing issue is whether “[Sharia councils] will respond more rapidly 
to pressure from within the community to move in line with under-
standings, including among Muslims, of equality and justice that re-
quire gender equality in family matters.”207 Because many Sharia arbi-
tration tribunals derive their power from religious, not State, 
authorities, some contend that the goal of equality in arbitrations, while 
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certainly commendable, requires social, not simply legal, action.208 At 
worst, the fear on this view is that without the requisite social reforms, 
Baroness Cox’s Equality Bill may run the risk of augmenting a “kind of 
disconnect between religious law and civil law;” or, perhaps more perti-
nently, the gap between law and society.209 
 The perceived gap between law and society has encouraged calls 
for greater legal recognition of awards handed down by Islamic arbitra-
tion tribunals.210 English courts “have refused to consider the impact of 
internal community pressure, demonstrating a deep misunderstanding 
of religious belief,” and, very often, “courts are not equipped with the 
knowledge, sensitivity, and patience to fully resolve religious dis-
putes.”211 This suggests that “religious issues would best be resolved us-
ing internal community solutions and systems.”212 Such a legal pluralist 
perspective aims to create spaces in which “more than one legal, or 
quasi-legal, regime occupies the same social field”213 and “multiple 
overlapping communities seek to apply their norms to a single act or 
actor.”214 
 One approach to implementing a legal pluralist scheme of gov-
ernance would be to confer territorial autonomy upon minority cul-
tural groups residing within the State.215 This approach entails granting 
“separate powers of internal administration . . . to regions possessing 
some ethnic or cultural distinctiveness, without those areas being de-
tached from the state.”216 Conceding territorial autonomy to sub-state 
cultural groups could provide political and governmental authority to 
groups inhabiting those regions, which could very well prove to be the 
best way to accommodate national minorities.217 
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 In England, if it should become apparent that accommodating 
social and cultural differences within society is not possible, “separate 
legal and political regimes may be needed.”218 For example, one schol-
ar suggests: 
English ideas of contract could . . . underpin recognitions of 
Islamic divorces as “valid,” to the extent that the parties to a 
religious divorce procedure sign affidavits agreeing to the 
terms of the procedure and the range of possible outcomes. 
In that case, to affirm validity would . . . [be] to see whether 
the [Sharia] council obeyed its own procedural rules.219 
Those adopting a legal pluralist perspective posit that by acknowledg-
ing the reality of “hybridity” rather than seeking to disregard it, English 
society would more likely be able to create spaces for “creative adapta-
tion, and innovation, and to inculcate ideals of tolerance, dialogue, and 
mutual accommodation.”220 Such hybrid legal spaces have been touted 
as providing the nearest means by which to promote the peaceful coex-
istence of social and cultural groups within a diverse world.221 
 Although a legal pluralist perspective would suggest that hybrid, 
parallel legal systems should operate without any intervention by the 
State, the English legal system has far too great of an interest in protect-
ing its citizens and upholding its historical tradition of equality to 
“completely turn a blind eye to injustices that may be carried out 
through religious arbitration.”222 Despite the benefits proposed by the 
legal pluralist perspective, various jurisdictions that have attempted to 
adopt such a hybrid legal system “are failing to provide their inhabi-
tants with either a just or a stable legal order.”223 Legal pluralism may 
also ultimately involve differential treatment of individuals that may 
threaten individual liberty and protections under the law.224 Further-
more, the legal pluralist perspective neglects to address the developing 
gap between law and society, and even threatens to exacerbate the di-
vide because a legal pluralist approach would suggest that society might 
develop separately, alongside, and never intersecting with, its parallel 
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national legal system.225 If bridging the gap between law and society 
remains a goal of the Parliament, legal pluralism does not provide a 
solution.226 
B. Suggested Social Reforms to Accompany the Equality Bill 
 In further considering the feared fissure between law and society, 
the ultimate issue raised by the Equality Bill becomes clear.227 Though 
deserving of praise—both in its stated goals and in its effort to uphold a 
stable, singular legal system—the Equality Bill’s ultimate shortcoming 
lies not within its text, but with its approach.228 The Bill’s attempt to 
remedy social problems of discrimination, domestic abuse, and ine-
quality through amendments to English laws must be accompanied by 
social, not only legal, reform.229 As it currently stands, the Bill’s purely 
legislative attempt to affect desired social changes may not only prove 
ineffective, but may actually work to augment the perceived divide be-
tween law and society.230 Legal reform alone may very well prove to be 
the demise of the proposed Bill.231 
 In order to avoid worsening the perceived gap between the Eng-
lish legal system and society, the Equality Bill should be accompanied 
by social reforms aimed at further accommodating Muslim community 
members within English society.232 Assuming sufficient enforcement 
mechanisms are implemented to ensure proper oversight of Sharia ar-
bitrations and to protect vulnerable parties, banning Sharia arbitration 
entirely “would be a much too severe response.”233 Sharia arbitration 
tribunals fill an important social role “of allowing members of a minor-
ity religious or cultural group to preserve their heritage and values,”234 
and the reality of large, fully developed Muslim communities within the 
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United Kingdom demands a greater social awareness and sensitivity on 
the part of British lawmakers toward these cultural values.235 
 A practical approach to social reform may entail enacting meas-
ures to encourage Muslim representation within the English political 
system.236 Encouraging Muslim minorities to participate fully in English 
civil society would lead to more proportionally accurate numbers of 
Muslims in public office.237 Such a move would position Muslims and 
other cultural minorities living under English law in a place to engage 
in governmental dialogue in “a horizontally organized deliberative 
process,” more clearly involving those groups in public society.238 
 In calling for increased opportunity for political representation by 
Muslim community members, an end to political hegemony is more 
imperative than a pursuit for total demographic accuracy in Parlia-
ment.239 “The focus of reform should be the removal of features that 
have resulted in lower representation of [Muslims] in the legislature 
than in the population.”240 By creating institutional links between reli-
gious groups and the affairs of the State, these social reforms may help 
“in developing politically informed and politically constructive religious 
perspectives that are not naively optimistic about the nature of poli-
tics.”241 Reforms aimed at encouraging public participation of Muslim 
and other minority groups may also work to foster a greater sense of 
tolerance and open-mindedness within English civil society,242 while 
also promoting “the stabilization of people’s identities and . . . their 
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couraging cultural differences to be channeled into democratic institu-
tions, and bridging the gap b ociety.245 
xisting English legal 
243 
 The value reached by such reforms lies not in affording cultural 
minorities “a share of political power,” but in granting recognition to 
minority groups as “equal, albeit culturally distinct, members of the pol-
ity with a right to be included in the decision-making process.”244 En-
acting such social reforms alongside the proposed Equality Bill would 
better ensure that English legal and social policies affecting Muslims 
and other minority cultural groups will “enjoy a greater degree of le-
gitimacy in the eyes of both majority and mi
etween law and s
Conclusion 
 For many Muslims currently living in England and Wales, observ-
ing Sharia principles has provided a sense of solidarity and inter-
connectedness to Islamic culture and other Muslims. The use of faith-
based arbitration services in connection with Sharia principles has been 
largely attributed to an interest in providing internal fora for dispute 
resolution, where Muslim community members often feel more com-
fortable presenting their matters to those who share a similar value sys-
tem. Though the judgments issued by these faith-based arbitration tri-
bunals lack binding legal authority, the recent growth of Sharia 
arbitration services throughout the region has raised concerns among 
British lawmakers. Chief among the problems identified by English leg-
islators are threats to both the sovereignty of the e
system and to England’s longstanding policy of promoting equality and 
the principle of non-discrimination within society. 
 Addressing these concerns, the Equality Bill proposes a legislative 
solution that aims to provide additional protection for the victims of 
domestic abuse, and to further provide for equality under the law of 
alternative arbitration and mediation services. Heralded as a compe-
tent response to both the legal and policy concerns identified by legis-
lators, the Equality Bill has been touted as likely to bring critical clarity 
to the law governing arbitration and mediation services, and likely to 
raise awareness of remedies under England’s equality and anti-
discrimination laws. Nevertheless, this Note urges that legislative re-
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form alone will not affect the desired goals of the Equality Bill. Without 
engaging in complementary social reforms, the Equality Bill may actu-
ally work to augment the growing divide between England’s governing 
legal system and its society. As this Note suggests, social reforms aimed 
at encouraging public participation of Muslim community members 
within English civil society may provide a means of bridging the rift be-
tween England’s existing legal system and its cultural minority popula-
tions. Until such reforms are embraced, any purely legislative attempt 
to rectify legal and social ills will be unlikely to address the growing gap 
between law and society in the United Kingdom. 
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